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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to sections 78-3 la-19(l) and 782a-3(2)(j) of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1996).

ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that there was no agreement between the

parties to arbitrate their dispute?
a.

Did the trial court err when it found that the defendant, Blue Cross and

Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue Cross"), did not establish that it sent Mr. McCoy notice
of its proposed amendment of his policy to provide for binding arbitration?
b.

If so, was mailing of the proposed amendment sufficient to bind Mr.

McCoy to arbitrate his disputes with Blue Cross?
c.

Did the trial court err when it implicitly rejected Blue Cross's argument

that Mr. McCoy agreed to arbitrate when he did not cancel his policy after learning
of his right to arbitration?
2.

If the trial court erred, what is the proper remedy?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although some courts have said that the denial of a motion to compel arbitration
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357,
360 (Utah 1996), that is because the arbitrabihty of a dispute generally depends on contract
-1-

interpretation and is thus a legal issue, O 'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 901
(10th Cir. 1992).1 The district court's underlying factual findings will be set aside only if
they are clearly erroneous. UTAH R. Civ. P. 52(a); O 'Connor, 965 F.2d at 901. See also
Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 344 (8th Cir. 1990) ("when the determination
of the arbitrability of a dispute is at issue, the district court's orders must be reviewed de
novo only to the extent we are reviewing the actual language of the arbitration agreement";
"to the extent that the district court's order is based upon factual findings, our review is
guided by the clearly erroneous standard").
Where the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is based on legal conclusions that
are in turn based on factualfindings,the Utah Supreme Court reviews the legal conclusions
for correctness but upholds the trial court's underlying factual determinations where they are
supported by the record. See Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356,
360-61 (Utah 1992).

1

Both Sosa and the case it relied on for its statement of the standard of review
involved underlying legal issues. The issue in Sosa was whether the contract was
unconscionable, which is a question of law. See 924 P.2d at 360. The issue in Docutel
Olivetti Corporation v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1996), the case Sosa
relied on, was one of contract interpretation, see 731 P.2d at 479, which also ordinarily
presents a question of law, Sacklerv. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). Here, on the
other hand, the issue is whether there was an agreement to arbitrate the parties' dispute,
which is generally a question of fact. See infra p. 3.
-2-

The existence of an arbitration agreement is generally a question of fact.2 See, e.g.,
RTKL Assocs., Inc. v. Four Villages Ltd. Partnership, 620 A.2d 351, 352 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App.), cert, denied, 626 A.2d 371 (Md. 1993); Ben-Reuven v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 526
N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feldman, 409N.Y.S.2d 150, 151
(App. Div. 1978), appeal denied, 390N.E.2d 1182 (N.Y. 1979); Hardin Constr. Group, Inc.
v. Strictly Painting, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997); Weber v. Hall, 929
S.W.2d 138, 141 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
A district court's findings regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement are
generally reviewed like any other factual findings and are upheld unless clearly erroneous.
Nordin, 897 F.2d at 344. Cf. Marshall v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539, 548 (8th Cir.
1991) (a district court'sfindingson a motion to stay an action pending arbitration are treated
the same as findings made after a bench trial and are reviewed for clear error). Cal
Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (the
findings of fact on which a trial court bases its legal conclusion that a contract exists are
reviewed the same as other factual findings), ajfd, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995).
Afindingof fact is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary foundation,
is against the clear weight of the evidence or was induced by an erroneous view of the law

2

So is the question of whether Blue Cross mailed notice of the arbitration
provision to Mr. McCoy. See Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647, 652
n.2 (Utah Ct. App.) ("mailing of notice is an issue of fact"), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356
(Utah 1993).
-3-

or "if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
Blue Cross argues that the clearly erroneous standard of review does not apply here
because the trial court's findings were based on affidavits and other documents. Although
some courts (including this court) have stated that an appellate court may review a trial
court's findings de novo where they are based solely on written materials, e.g., In re
Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) says that a trial court's findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous," "whether based on oral or documentary evidence." Other courts have applied
an "ameliorated" clearly erroneous standard where findings are based on written testimony.
See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1349 & n.8 (11th
Cir. 1982); Green v. Russell County, 603 F.2d 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1979); McKensie v. Sea
LandServ., Inc., 551 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1977); Hilt v. Draper, 836 P.2d 558, 562 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1992); Trad Indus., Ltd. v. Brogan, 805 P.2d 54, 59 (Mont. 1991). Under this
standard, the burden of establishing clear error is not so heavy, but deference is still given
to the trial court, as the finder of fact, and its findings will not be disturbed if there is
substantial competent evidence to support them. See Seaboard, 690 F.2d at 1349; Green,
603 F.2d at 573-74; Hilt, 836 P.2d at 562.
In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 360-61 (Utah 1992),
the Utah Supreme Court applied the "clearly erroneous" standard to a trial court's factual
findings that one party had participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration
-4-

and that the other party had been prejudiced thereby, even though the underlying facts were
not disputed and the appellate court was therefore in as good a position as the trial court to
resolve the issue. See 833 P.2d at 361-62 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf.
Haywood v. Gill 16 Utah 2d 299, 400 P.2d 16, 18 (1965) (upholding findings based on
documentary evidence, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary); Bass v.
Englesath (In re Estate ofCustick), 842 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (if the trial court
relies on extrinsic evidence to interpret an ambiguous document, its interpretation is a factual
matter that will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous, even where the extrinsic
evidence consists of other documents). This court should follow Chandler and uphold the
trial court's factualfindingsif they are supported by the record.3

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) governs the standard of review. Sections 78-3 la-3
and -4 of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1996) require a valid written agreement to arbitrate
before the court can compel arbitration. Former section 31-37-16(1) of the UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED

(Supp. 1985) (repealed 1985, effective 1986) governed the validity of

3

Blue Cross also argues that this court's review "must be conducted in light of
the well established rule that under Utah law all doubts are resolved in favor of arbitration."
(Br. of Appellant at 3-4 (citing Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359).) While arbitration is favored in Utah
"in some cases," the public policy favoring arbitration only applies once an agreement to
arbitrate has been established. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). No
public pohcy favorsfindingan agreement where none exists. The existence of an arbitration
agreement is determined in the same way as the existence of any other contract. See also
infra point III.
-5-

endorsements to health insurance policies issued by nonprofit health service corporations
such as Blue Cross at the time Blue Cross purported to amend its policy to include an
arbitration provision. Section 31A-21-314(2) of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1994) and
R590-122-4.3 & .5 of the UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE (Supp. Oct 1, 1997) (formerly UTAH
ADMIN. CODE

R540-122-4.3 & .5 (1989)) govern arbitration provisions in insurance policies

since 1987. Section 31A-21-106(2) of the UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (Supp. 1997) governs
modifications of insurance policies since July 1, 1986. These statutes and rules are set out
in the addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
After his wife, Frieda, died of breast cancer, the plaintiff Gerald McCoy, brought this

action against Blue Cross alleging various claims arising out of Blue Cross's decision to deny
Mrs. McCoy coverage for treatment she needed to save her life. (Record ("R.") 2-13.)
Blue Crossfileda motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. (R. 17-18.)
It was undisputed that the policy Blue Cross had issued to Mr. McCoy did not require
arbitration, but Blue Cross claimed that it had unilaterally amended the policy after it was
issued to require mandatory arbitration of any dispute under the policy.
Mr. McCoy responded to the motion by arguing that the arbitration provision Blue
Cross relied on was unenforceable for a variety of reasons: (1) Mr. McCoy never agreed to
arbitrate his claims and never received notice of the alleged amendment of the policy to add
-6-

an arbitration provision; (2) any agreement to arbitrate was invalid because it was
fraudulently obtained; (3) the arbitration provision was unenforceable because the plaintiff
had alleged fraud; (4) the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was
procedurally unconscionable; (5) the purported contract modification was not supported by
consideration; and (6) Blue Cross could not enforce the supposed arbitration agreement
because it had breached the policy's grievance procedures. (R. 60-78.) After two hearings
(see R. 297 & 298) and supplemental briefing (R. 230-36, 254-60), the trial court found the
first argument dispositive and did not reach the other arguments (R. 276-79).
The trial court concluded that Blue Cross had not met its burden of establishing that
it had ever sent Mr. McCoy notice of the purported amendment of the policy to require
arbitration. (R. 279,1f 5.) Consequently, the court denied Blue Cross's motion to compel
arbitration and stay the proceedings. (R. 279.) Blue Cross has appealed that decision. (R.
281-83.)

B.

Statement of Facts
In October 1985, Gerald McCoy changed his health insurance coverage from a group

policy provided by Blue Cross through his former employer to an individual policy provided
by Blue Cross known as the Qualifier I plan. (R. 80, f 2, & 88-114.) The policy did not
contain an arbitration provision. (R. 80, ^ 3.) In connection with his change in health
insurance, Mr. McCoy received a brochure explaining the Qualifier I plan. The brochure did
not mention arbitration. (R. 80, f 4, & 115-22.) Mr. McCoy was the senior contract
-7-

manager on the Trans-Alaska pipeline and reviewed and managed other contracts
professionally. He was aware of the importance of documenting changes in contracts and
of the importance of record-keeping. (R 80, f 5.) His wife, Frieda, was a librarian and was
also aware of the importance of record-keeping. (R. 80, f 6.) The two kept meticulous
records. (SeeR. 81, % 7.)
According to Edwina Green, a paralegal in the Blue Cross legal department, in the fall
of 1985 Blue Cross decided to amend its policies to add a binding arbitration provision,
effective January 1, 1986. (R. 31,ffif2-3.) Ms. Green submitted an affidavit stating that in
November 1985 she directed Blue Cross's programming department to prepare a tape of all
subscribers who were insured under a Qualifier I Type 57H policy. They were to be sent a
cover letter and an endorsement by December 1,1985. (R 31,ffij4-5.) Among other things,
the cover letter stated:
[E]ffective January 1, 1986 we will adopt an arbitration procedure for the
resolution of any disputes you may have with Blue Cross . . . . This will save
you the trouble of having to go through the courts to settle a dispute with us,
and should further save money on behalf of our subscribers.
(R 34.)4 The endorsement purported to amend the "General Terms and Conditions" section
of Blue Cross's policies to incorporate a binding arbitration provision. (R. 35.)
In her affidavit, Ms. Green stated that Mr. McCoy was covered through a Qualifier
I Type 57H policy since October 16,1985. (R 32, f 6.) Ms. Green could not say, however,

4

Despite Blue Cross's representation, the purported amendment of Mr.
McCoy's policy did not save him money. (R. 85,129.)
-8-

that Mr. McCoy's name and address were actually on the tape that Blue Cross delivered to
the printer or on the letters that the printer delivered to the mailing service, nor could she say
that a letter addressed to Mr. McCoy was actually deposited in the mail. Blue Cross did not
produce a copy of the tape showing that Mr. McCoy was included on the mailing list.
The McCoys never received the letter or endorsement. (R. 81,fflf7-10.)
Sometime before 1994 Blue Cross purportedly issued revised versions of the Health
Care Agreement for the Qualifier I Type 57H policy. (See R. 38-47A.) The McCoys never
received a copy of the revised policies either. (R. 81, ^f 9.)
The last revision, dated "7/89," set out a four-step "member grievance procedure" to
resolve complaints regarding coverage. (R. 46.) The first step was to contact the Customer
Service Department. If the grievance could not be resolved by telephone, "an investigation
will be initiated when the grievance is received by the Plan and will result in a written
decision, a copy of which will be sent to you." (R. 46.) The second step was a written
appeal to the Claims Appeal Committee. This appeal was to be made within sixty days after
receiving notification of the Customer Service Department's decision, and the Claims Appeal
Committee had sixty days to reach a decision and notify the insured of the decision in
writing. The third step was to appeal to Blue Cross's General Counsel, in which case "[a]n
investigation will be completed within ten (10) working days and you will receive written

-9*

notification of the decision." (R.46.) The fourth and final step was binding arbitration. (R.
46.)5
By March 1994 Mrs. McCoy had been diagnosed with breast cancer. Chemotherapy
had been ineffective. Mrs. McCoy's treating physician, Dr. Patrick G. Beatty, recommended
that she receive high dose chemotherapy with peripheral stem cell rescue (HDCT/PSCR).
Time was critical. If the treatment was to be effective, Mrs. McCoy needed it right away.
The McCoys asked Blue Cross to preauthorize this treatment, but Blue Cross refused. (R.
81, If 11.) Blue Cross told the McCoys that their request was denied "for medical necessity"
and because "[t]he patient has no obvious disease and has had no chemotherapy." (R. 123.)
These statements were flat-out wrong, and Blue Cross knew they were wrong. Mrs. McCoy
had cancer; she had been through chemotherapy; and she would die without the requested
treatment. The McCoys and their physicians had provided Blue Cross with documents
showing that the reasons it gave for its denial were wrong. (R. 81, ^f 11.) Nevertheless, Blue
Cross denied the request.
On May 25, 1994, Mr. McCoy faxed to Blue Cross a package of materials appealing
Blue Cross's denial and again requesting approval of HDCT/PSCR for Mrs. McCoy. Mr.
McCoy received a confirmation that the fax was received. Mr. McCoy did not hear anything

5

An earlier version of the policy included yet another step before binding
arbitration. The insured could "submit a report to the Consumer Service Division of the Utah
State Insurance Department for consideration." (R. 40.) There was no evidence that the
Insurance Department was even set up to handle such appeals. (See Tr., 2-6-98, R.298, at
15.)
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from Blue Cross for over a month. On June 30, 1994, he called the Medical Claims section
and was told that they had no record of his appeal but that someone would call him back the
next day. When he had not heard anything by July 5, 1994, Mr. McCoy wrote to Blue Cross
again, requesting "an immediate response in writing to [his] appeal." (R. 82,113, & 124.)
On July 14, 1994, Blue Cross wrote to Mr. McCoy to say that it had received the
information he had submitted and that Blue Cross's Appeals Committee would make a
decision as soon as an independent medical adviser had reviewed the medical information.
(R. 82, f 14, & 125.)
The McCoys did not hear anything more from Blue Cross until they received a letter
dated September 29, 1994, upholding the decision to deny Mrs. McCoy treatment, on the
grounds that the McCoys' policy "specifically excludes bone marrow transplant services in
the treatment of breast cancer." (R. 82, If 4, & 126.) In fact, the McCoys' policy included
no such exclusion. (See R. 99-102.)
On October 3,1994, the McCoys appealed the Appeals Committee's decision to Blue
Cross's general counsel, Frank Pignanelli. (R. 83, % 16, & 127.) Mr. Pignanelli responded
on October 19, 1994, by asking for ten more working days to review Mrs. McCoy's medical
records and respond to the appeal because "the file in this matter is rather extensive." (R.
128.)
On November 3, 1994, Mr. Pignanelli wrote to Mr. McCoy asking for information
about other insurance. (R. 129-30.) Mr. McCoy responded that he did not see how other
insurance the McCoys might have was relevant to the issue of coverage under the Blue Cross
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policy. (R. 131.)6 On January 13, 1995, Mr. Pignanelli wrote to Mr. McCoy stating that
Blue Cross did not have to make any determination of benefits due under the policy because
the McCoys had not responded to Blue Cross's request for information about other health
insurance. In any event, Mr. Pignanelli stated, "the decision of the Benefit Appeals
Committee is correct." (R. 132.)
Thus, in a case of life or death where time was of the essence, over a period often
months Blue Cross had gone from "you're not sick and don't need the treatment" to "we
don't cover if to "someone else should pay for it." Blue Cross's treatment of the McCoys'
claim not only violated its own policies for resolving disputes over claims but also violated
Utah law, which requires the insurer to acknowledge receipt of a claim within 15 days,
provide substantive responses to pertinent communications from a claimant within 15 days,
complete its investigation of the claim within 45 days and advise the claimant of the
acceptance or denial of a claim within 30 days after receipt of a notice of loss. See UTAH
ADMIN. CODE

R590-89-10, -11 & 12 (Oct. 1, 1996). Moreover, Utah law does not allow

6

Mr. McCoy acknowledged that the existence of other insurance could be
relevant to the amount Blue Cross might have to pay but not to its obligation to pay
something. (R. 131.) In fact, the McCoys had other health insurance through Mr. McCoy's
employer. Although that insurer initially denied coverage for Mrs. McCoy's treatment as
well, it later reversed its decision. The McCoys were pursuing coverage under both policies
simultaneously. By the time the McCoys received a final denial from Blue Cross, Mrs.
McCoy had received HDCT/PSCR through the McCoys9 other health insurance, but Blue
Cross's baseless denials of coverage had needlessly delayed her treatment in a situation
where time was critical to Mrs. McCoy's chances of survival.
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piecemeal denials of a claim but requires the insured to communicate any basis for the denial
of the claim promptly and in writing to the claimant. Id. R590-89-12.B.
Mr. Pignanelli's letter concluded: "If you remain dissatisfied with this decision, you
have the right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. The Customer Service Department can assist you with information
about how to initiate and participate in arbitration." (R. 133.) This was the first time Mr.
McCoy learned that arbitration was a means of resolving his dispute with Blue Cross. (R.
83-84,fflf20-21.)7 Mr. McCoy understood from Mr. Pignanelli's letter that arbitration was
an option he was entitled to, but he did not understand that it was his only option. (R. 83-84,
%20.)
On March 2, 1995, Mrs. McCoy diedfromcomplicationsfrombreast cancer. (R. 85,
If 28.)
Mr. McCoy laterfiledthis action against Blue Cross alleging claims for, among other
things, breach of express contract, breach of Blue Cross's implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing, negligence, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,fraudulentand
negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages. (R. 2-13.)

7

Mr. McCoy had previously received Explanation of Claims Processed forms
from Blue Cross, which stated that he had "theright"to arbitration. (R. 84, % 22, & 135-36.)
Mr. McCoy did not recall reading this language before but testified that, if he had, he would
not have understood from the language that binding arbitration was his only option or that
he was precluded from bringing a court action against Blue Cross. (R. 84, % 23.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Before a party can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute, he first must have agreed to
arbitrate it, and Mr. McCoy never agreed to arbitrate his claims against Blue Cross. It is
undisputed that the policy in effect when Mr. McCoy enrolled in the Qualifier I plan did not
require arbitration. Blue Cross claims that it later amended the contract to include a binding
arbitration provision, but the McCoys never received the endorsement adding the provision,
nor did they receive a copy of the amended plan before Mr. McCoy brought this action.
(Point LA.)
Blue Cross argues that the McCoys did not have to receive the endorsement—it just
had to mail it to them. Even assuming that were the case, Blue Cross did not meet its burden
ofproving that it effectively amended the contract to require arbitration. (Point LB.) It did
not present any direct evidence that a letter to Mr. McCoy was actually printed, inserted in
an envelope addressed to Mr. McCoy and presented for mailing (point LB. 1), nor did Blue
Cross show that notice of the proposed modification of the contract was sent to Mr. McCoy
by first-class mail, as required by the contract (point LB.2). Blue Cross also failed to show
that it complied with the applicable statutes and rules governing its purported modification
of the contract. (Point LB.3.) In any event, the mere mailing of a notice that is never
received is insufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate. The statute requires an actual
agreement to arbitrate, not constructive notice of a unilateral change in a contract to require
binding arbitration. Blue Cross cannot bootstrap a so-called agreement that notice is
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effective on mailing into an agreement to arbitrate where the insured never received notice
of the proposed change. (Point I.B.4.)
Blue Cross argues that even if Mr. McCoy did not agree to an arbitration provision
he knew nothing about, he effectively agreed to arbitrate his disputes when he failed to
cancel the policy after he learned of the provision. But Mr. McCoy did not see the provision
until after he filed this action. Although he knew that he had a "right" to arbitration before,
he did not know that arbitration was his only option. Mr. McCoy did not even learn of his
right to arbitrate until after his wife was diagnosed with breast cancer. He could not have
canceled the policy at that time without losing coverage. Therefore, his failure to cancel the
policy cannot preclude him from bringing this action. (Point I.C.)
If the trial court erred in finding that there was no agreement to arbitrate, this court
should remand the case for the trial court to consider Mr. McCoy's other arguments as to
why the arbitration agreement is unenforceable. (Point H)
Finally, the asserted presumption in favor of arbitration should not apply in this case
as a matter of public policy. A health insurer should not be able to unilaterally change an
adhesion contract to require binding arbitration, thus depriving an insured of his or her
constitutional right to go to court, and thereby insulate its policies and practices from
meaningful judicial review. (Point IE.)
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ARGUMENT
I.
MR. McCOY NEVER AGREED TO ARBITRATE
HIS CLAIMS AGAINST BLUE CROSS.
Before a party can be compelled to arbitrate a dispute, he first must have agreed to
arbitrate it. See, e.g., AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986); Worthington & Kimball Constr. Co. v. C&A Dev. Co., Ill P.2d 475, 479 (Utah
1989). The Utah Arbitration Act states:
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and
order or deny arbitration accordingly.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-31a-4(l) (1996) (emphasis added).8 The trial court in effect

concluded that Blue Cross had not met its burden of showing an agreement to arbitrate. The
trial court's conclusion was correct, under whatever standard it is reviewed. This court
should therefore affirm the trial court's order denying Blue Cross's motion to compel
arbitration.

8

The Utah Supreme Court has recently construed section 78-3 la-4 and section
78-3 la-3, which makes a ''written agreement5' to submit a controversy to arbitration valid and
enforceable, as requiring arbitration agreements to be in writing to be enforceable. Jenkins
v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998).
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A.

Mr. McCoy Did Not Agree to Arbitrate His Claims Because He Did Not Know
About the Arbitration Provision Blue Cross Relies On.
It is undisputed that the insurance policy Mr. McCoy signed up for and received did

not include an arbitration provision. Blue Cross claims that it later amended the contract to
include a binding arbitration provision, but Mr. McCoy did not agree to arbitrate his claims
because he never knew about-much less agreed to-the purported modification of the
contract until he brought this action. (See R. 266, ^f 4.)9

9

In his first affidavit, filed in opposition to Blue Cross's motion to compel
arbitration, Mr. McCoy stated that he "never received notice of the arbitration requirement
that Blue Cross alleges was added to the policy . . . until some time in January 1995." (R.
81, Tf 10.) In his supplemental affidavit, Mr. McCoy clarified that statement. In January
1995 Mr. McCoy received a letter from Mr. Pignanelli, general counsel for Blue Cross,
denying his appeal and stating that if Mr. McCoy was not satisfied with his decision, he had
"the right to seek binding arbitration of the dispute pursuant to the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association." (R. 133.) Mr. McCoy understood from Mr. Pignanelli's letter that
he had the right to arbitrate his dispute, not that he was required to arbitrate his dispute. (R.
83-84, % 20; 266, If 3.) Mr. McCoy further stated, "I did not receive a copy of the arbitration
provision that Blue Cross relies on in January 1995 or at any other time before I brought this
action." (R. 266,14.) Blue Cross did not challenge Mr. McCoy's supplemental affidavit.
Instead, it submitted an affidavit from Mr. Pignanelli. Mr. Pignanelli agreed that he sent the
letter to Mr. McCoy, stated that a "true and correct copy" of the letter was attached to his
affidavit, and said that, "[b]ased upon my review of my McCoy file, I conclude that I
enclosed a copy of the Type 57J health care agreement and the appropriate endorsements
with that letter." (R. 262,fflf6-7.) No letter is attached to Mr. Pignanelli's affidavit, much
less any enclosure. (See R. 261-64.) The letter Mr. McCoy received stated, "I would refer
you to the language contained in the Endorsement that was attached to your health care
agreement, a copy of which is enclosed." (R. 132.) This language is ambiguous as to
whether the endorsement was enclosed or the agreement was enclosed. Mr. McCoy received
a copy of the referenced endorsement with Mr. Pignanelli's letter. (See R. 83, ^ 20; 132-34.)
That endorsement dealt with bone marrow transplants; it said nothing about arbitration. (See
R. 134.) Mr. McCoy did not receive a copy of the policy with Mr. Pignanelli's letter. (See
R. 132-34; 266, % 4.)
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Utah courts have consistently refused to enforce provisions of insurance contracts
where, as here, the insured did not receive notice of the existence and import of the
provision. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d231, 236-37 (Utah 1985); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Martinez, 668 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1983); Moore v. Energy
Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141, 1144-46 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Neither the policy nor the
brochure Mr. McCoy received when he enrolled in the Qualifier I plan said that he had to
arbitrate any dispute with Blue Cross; instead, they allowed him to seek redress of his rights
in court. Because Mr. McCoy did not receive notice of any change in his policy to require
arbitration-much less agreed to any such change-the trial court properly concluded that he
could not be compelled to arbitrate his claims against Blue Cross.

B,

Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That It Effectively Amended Its
Policy to Require Arbitration of Mr. McCoy's Claims.
Blue Cross argues that Mr. McCoy agreed to a provision he never knew about because

he is conclusively deemed to have agreed to changes in his policy if Blue Cross mailed the
change to him, regardless of whether he ever received it, and Blue Cross mailed the
endorsement purporting to add an arbitration provision to Mr. McCoy.
There are several problems with this argument. First, Blue Cross did not meet its
burden of showing that it mailed the endorsement to Mr. McCoy. Second, Blue Cross did
not meet its burden of proving that it complied with the notice requirements of the contract,
on which it relies. Third, Blue Cross did not meet its burden of proving that its purported

-18-

change in the contract complied with governing statutes and rules. Fourth, even assuming
that Blue Cross proved that the proposed arbitration provision was mailed, as a matter of law
mere mailing is not enough to establish a binding, enforceable agreement to arbitrate.

1.

Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That It Mailed the
Arbitration Endorsement to Mr. McCoy.

In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Blue Cross submitted the Affidavit of
Edwina H. Green. (See R. 30.) When the trial court invited the parties to submit
supplemental memoranda, Blue Cross submitted a supplemental affidavit from Ms. Green
(R. 242) and affidavits from Gary C. Warner of Image Printing (R. 237),10 Gary Nelsen of
Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (R. 249) and Mr. Pignanelli of Blue Cross (R. 261).11
These affidavits, taken together, show that sometime around November 11, 1985, Blue Cross
prepared a tape of all subscribers who were supposed to receive the endorsement purporting
to add the arbitration provision to the contract and forwarded the tape to Image Printing,
which printed a cover letter to go with the endorsement, inserting the subscriber's name and
address on Blue Cross letterhead. The letters and endorsements were then forwarded to
Progressive Direct Mail Advertising for mailing. (See R. 31, 1f 4; 238-39; 243-44.)
10

Mr. Warner's affidavit is titled, indexed in the record and referred to in Blue
Cross's brief as the "Affidavit of Keith Stoddard." However, it starts out "I, Gary C.
Warner" (R. 238), and is signed by Mr. Warner (R. 239). Presumably, it is Mr. Warner's
affidavit and not Mr. Stoddard's.
11

Mr. Pignanelli's affidavit went only to the question of Mr. McCoy's alleged
acceptance of the arbitration provision after he learned of it, discussed in pt. I.C, infra.
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According to Ms. Green, Mr. McCoy's name "would have" been on the tape because the
letter and endorsement were to go to everyone insured under a Qualifier I - Type 57H policy,
and Mr. McCoy was insured under such a policy as of October 16, 1985. (See R. 31-32 &
244, ^ 8.) However, Ms. Green could not say for sure that Mr. McCoy's name and address
were actually on the tape (see R. 278-79, f 4), and Blue Cross did not produce a copy of the
tape.
Blue Cross criticizes the trial court's finding that Blue Cross relied "solely on the
affidavit of Ms. Green as evidence that [it] mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr. McCoy"
(R. 277, If 6). (See Br. of Appellant at 16-17.) Although Blue Cross also submitted
affidavits from the printer (Mr. Warner) and the mailer (Mr. Nelsen), those affidavits merely
set out the procedures those companies would have followed in the fall of 1985. (See R.
238-39, 250-52.) Neither one could say what names were included on the tape that Blue
Cross prepared, what names were printed on the letters or to whom the letters were sent. Ms.
Green was the only one who even purported to tie Mr. McCoy to the mailing, and the most
she could say was that Mr. McCoy's name should have been included on the tape.12 None
of the affiants could say for sure that Mr. McCoy's name and address were actually on the
tape, that a letter was actually printed addressed to Mr. McCoy, that the letter and
12

According to Ms. Green, Mr. McCoy's name should have been included on the
subscriber tape because the tape was meant to include all subscribers under two different
plans-the 57H nongroup plan and the IGE group plan-and Mr. McCoy had been a member
of the IGE plan from October 1, 1985, until "[approximately one week later," when Mr.
McCoy's insurance was converted to a 57H nongroup contract. (R. 244.) Ms. Green could
not say, however, under which plan Mr. McCoy was included on the tape. (See R. 244.)
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endorsement were inserted into an envelope and that they were actually mailed to Mr.
McCoy.
These omissions are important because this court has held that, before an inference
can arise that a particular letter was actually mailed, there must be "direct evidence" that the
letter was actually prepared, that is, that the particular document in question was written,
signed, addressed and placed in the regular place of mailing. Ulster v. Utah Valley
Community College, 881 P.2d 933, 940-42 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13
(Utah 1995).
In Litster, the plaintiff (Litster) sued Utah Valley Community College, a governmental
entity. The college moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Litster had not
complied with the notice provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which required
that he file a notice of claim with the Attorney General within one year of his injury. A
secretary in the Attorney General's office submitted an affidavit stating that the Attorney
General had never received a notice of claimfromLitster. Litster's attorney submitted an
affidavit stating that it was his "official office procedure" to send a notice of claim to the
Attorney General in such cases, that he had sent a notice of claim to the college (which was
not disputed) and had given "handwritten direction" to his secretary to also sent a copy of
the notice to the Attorney General, and that it was the policy of his office that, "when
direction is given to send notices, that direction is followed." Id. at 935. The attorney also
submitted a supplemental affidavit, in which he stated that it was the practice of his secretary
to comply with instructions on the day or the day after she received them, that he instructed
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her on a certain date to mail notice of the claim to the Attorney General's office, that it was
her practice to take the notice and place it in an envelope with postage prepaid and deposit
it in a post office box in their building, from which the postal service picked up the mail at
a certain time each evening. The attorney also stated, "It is my understanding and my belief
that the practice of my office was followed in the present case and that in fact notice was
copied, placed in a postage prepaid envelope, addressed to the Utah State Attorney General's
Office, and mailed on November 25 or November 26, 1991." Id at 936. The court found
this evidence insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the required
notice was given. Id at 942.
The court noted that, while an inference of mailing can arise from evidence of an
office mailing custom, there first must be "direct evidence" that the document in question
was actually prepared. Id at 940-41. The affidavits of Litster's attorney failed to provide
direct evidence that the notice of claim allegedly mailed to the Attorney General was ever
prepared. The attorney did not say that he dictated a letter addressed to the Attorney
General, signed it or gave it to his secretary, nor did the secretary say that she actually typed
a notice addressed to the Attorney General or made a photocopy of the notice that was sent
to the college and placed it in an envelope addressed to the Attorney General. Id at 941.
The most the affidavits established was that a letter addressed to the Attorney General should
have been prepared and mailed, in the regular course of the attorney's business. This was
insufficient to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the required notice was actually
mailed.
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Similarly, in this case, the most Blue Cross's affidavits established was that a letter
addressed to Mr. McCoy should have been prepared, but there was no direct evidence that
such a letter was actually prepared, that is, that a letter actually addressed to Mr. McCoy was
printed, placed in an envelope and placed in the regular place for mailing. This was
insufficient to meet Blue Cross's burden of showing that it actually mailed notice to Mr.
McCoy. See id. at 940-42. See also Bennett Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14 Utah 2d 161, 380 P.2d
69, 71 (1963) (an insurer's evidence fell short of proving that it mailed a notice of
cancellation to the insured where it consisted of testimony regarding the business routine and
practice of its agent in preparing and mailing such notices but "it was not shown that such
routine or practice had been followed with regard to the instant alleged notice"). Cf Shafer
v. A.I.T.S., Inc., 428 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (the purported sender failed to
establish the "threshold requirement" of showing that a letter was actually prepared where
it merely showed that the name of the purported recipient was on a tape and that "this tape
ran all the way through") (cited with approval in Litster).
Blue Cross relies on Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company, 851 P.2d
647 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993), for its argument that it
provided sufficient evidence to prove it mailed the arbitration endorsement to the McCoys.
That case, however, is distinguishable because the undisputed facts in that case showed not
only that the insurer followed its normal business procedure in preparing cancellation
notices, but also that it had actually prepared and addressed a cancellation notice to the
plaintiff insured, addressed to "Hauns Baumgart / DBA-H.P.B. / 2469 East 7000 South #200
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/ Salt Lake City, UT 84121." See 851 P.2d at 650, 652. It was also undisputed that the
insurer prepared a mailing certificate showing that notice to the plaintiff was mailed.
Moreover, the insurer produced a copy of Postal Service Form 3877, which it used to record
addresses to which it sent certified mail, and this form indicated that the United States Postal
Service had received from the insurer a notice of cancellation form mailed to the plaintiff.
Id. at 650. Thus, there was direct evidence that a notice to the plaintiff was actually
prepared, addressed and delivered to the Postal Service. Here, there was no direct evidence
that a letter addressed to Mr. McCoy was actually prepared and deposited in the mail, only
that one should have been prepared and mailed in the usual course of the businesses of Blue
Cross, Image Printing and Progressive Direct Mail Advertising. Under the holdings of
Litster, Bennett and Shafer, that is not enough to meet Blue Cross's burden of proving that
the notice was mailed.13

13

Even where a letter is prepared, proof of office custom may not be enough to
establish that the letter was actually mailed where the letter was never received. While some
courts hold that evidence of office custom alone is enough to raise an inference or even a
presumption that a particular mailing took place, others require corroborating evidence. See
Litster, 881 P.2d at 941-42 n.7. Moreover, failure to receive an article through the mail
raises a presumption that it was not mailed. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Maes, 235
F.2d 918, 921 (10th Cir. 1956). In any event, any presumption such evidence creates is
rebuttable, and some courts have held that sworn testimony that a letter was never received
can rebut a presumption of receipt. See, e.g., Witt v. Roadway Express, 136F.3d 1424, 1430
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 119 S. Ct. 188 (1998); Diamond T. Utah, Inc. v. Canal Ins. Co., 12
Utah 2d 37, 361 P.2d 665, 667 (1961). Mr. McCoy testified under oath that he never
received the alleged mailing. {See R. 266, f 4.) Thus, Blue Cross is wrong when it says that
"the evidence regarding mailing was unrebutted." (Br. of Appellant at 17; see also id. at 20.)
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Blue Cross's evidence was also deficient in another respect. The evidence Blue Cross
relies on to show that Mr. McCoy was sent the endorsement shows that seventy of the letters
Blue Cross purports to have mailed were not mailed. Blue Cross delivered a tape with
subscribers' names and addresses to Image Printing. (R. 31, Tf 4.) From the tape, Image
Printing printed and charged Blue Cross for 30,426 letters addressed to Blue Cross
policyholders. (See R. 238-39, 248.) However, Image only delivered 30,356 letters to
Progressive for mailing, and Progressive only mailed 30,356 letters. (R. 245,ffif13-14; 248.)
From this evidence and the fact that the McCoys never received the letter and endorsement,
the trial court could reasonably conclude that Blue Cross did not meet its burden of
establishing that it ever mailed notice of the arbitration provision to Mr. McCoy.14

2.

Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That It Complied with the
Contract Requirements for Notice.

Even if Blue Cross had proved that it mailed the arbitration endorsement to Mr.
McCoy, that would not be sufficient to amend his policy to require arbitration. For a mailing
to be effective under the policy, the mailing must comply with the terms of the policy.

14

Blue Cross's evidence that it mailed the amended policies to Mr. McCoy was
even more deficient. Ms. Green merely stated that, as the holder of a Qualifier I - Type 57H
policy, Mr. McCoy "would have received all reprints and additions of the health care
agreement. .. sent by Blue Cross . . . at various times." (R. 32, f 7.) Ms. Green does not
identify the "reprints and additions" that would have been sent to the McCoys, does not say
how they would have been sent or when they would have been sent and does not say
specifically that they were sent to Mr. McCoy, much less that they were properly addressed
and mailed to him by first-class mail on a specific date.
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Mr. McCoy's policy defined the "Agreement" as "this document and attached riders
when duly issued by the Plan" (as well as certain other documents not relevant here). (R.
102 (emphasis added).) The endorsement Blue Cross relies on was never "attached" to Mr.
McCoy's policy. Thus, it did not become a part of his agreement.
The policy further provided:
MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT
The Plan shall at all times have the absolute right to modify or amend this
Agreement from time to time; provided, however, that no such modification
or amendment shall be effective until thirty (SO) days after written notice
thereof has been given to the Subscriber.
(R. 109 (emphasis added).) Under Utah law, the language of an insurance policy must be
construed as an ordinary purchaser of insurance would understand it, United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co. v. Sandu 854 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1993), and an ordinary purchaser of
insurance could reasonably understand this language to require actual notice to the insured
before Blue Cross could change the policy.
However, a later provision in the policy states:
Any notice to the Subscriber provided for in this Agreement shall be deemed
to have been given to and received by the Subscriber when deposited in the
United States Mail with first class postage prepaid and addressed to the
Subscriber at the address shown in the records of the Plan. Any notice to the
Plan provided for in this Agreement may be given by mail addressed to Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, P.O. Box 30270, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130;
provided, however, that any notice to the Plan shall not be deemed to have
been given to and received by the Plan until physically received by the Plan.
(R. 112 (emphasis added).) In other words, notice to the insured is effective on mailing, but
notice to Blue Cross must be actually received.
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Assuming that such a one-sided provision in an adhesion contract is not
unconscionable and could be enforced, cf. Smith v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 313 N.E.2d 21, 2325 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1973) (a clause providing that mailing notice is sufficient proof of notice
was void as against public policy), Blue Cross failed to meet its burden of showing that it
complied with the policy provision for notice. Nowhere in any of the affidavits that Blue
Cross submitted does it say that the notice Blue Cross purportedly mailed to the McCoys was
sent byfirstclass mail. (See R. 30-32, 237-40, 242-46, 249-52.) Thus, even if Blue Cross
could establish an agreement to arbitrate merely by showing that it gave notice under the
contract of its unilateral modification of the contract to add an arbitration provision, Blue
Cross's proof fails because it has not shown that it complied with the contractual
requirements for notice.
Blue Cross relies on Diamond T. Utah Inc. v. Canal Insurance Company, 12 Utah
2d 37, 361 P.2d 665 (1961), for its argument that mailing is sufficient to change the contract.
Diamond T. is dispositive of Blue Cross's argument, but not in the way Blue Cross thinks.
In that case, the insured sought coverage for a loss under its policy. The insurer showed that
its agent had prepared a notice of cancellation and mailed it to the insured before the loss
occurred. The trial court found that the notice had been mailed but nevertheless found that
the policy was in effect at the time of the loss, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
The policy at issue required the mailing of "written notice stating when not less than
ten days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing of notice as aforesaid
shall be sufficient proof of notice." Quotedin 361 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added). Thecourt
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noted that the majority of decisions that had considered such policy provisions had held that
actual receipt of a cancellation notice by the insured "is not a condition precedent to the
cancellation of the insurance by the insurer, provided the cancellation notice itself contains
afixeddate on which the cancellation is to become effective." Id. (footnote omitted).15 The
court further noted: "The rationale of these decisions is that the express terms of the contract
uphold the sufficiency of a notice deposited in the mail, and that such provision, being
unambiguous, must be enforced as written." 361 P.2d at 667.
The insurer in Diamond T. sent a notice of cancellation that stated: "THE
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CANCELLATION SHALL BE FIVE (5) DAYS AFTER SERVICE
OF THIS NOTICE." Quoted in id The court held that the notice that was mailed "did not
comply with the provisions of the cancellation clause." Id. "The notice did not fix a date
certain upon which the cancellation was to be effective but instead provided for a time to
becomefixedby the happening of a future event, namely the service of the notice upon the
insured

" Id. Because the insurer had not "strictly complied with the policy provisions,

the mere mailing of the notice was not sufficient proof of notice." Id.16
15

The court further noted that "there is probably a presumption that mail properly
addressed and deposited is received," 361 P.2d at 667 (emphasis added), but found that the
presumption had been overcome by the testimony of two of the purported recipients that they
had not received the notice. Id.
16

The court in Diamond T. also held a reinsurer liable under the terms of its
reinsurance contract even though the reinsurer had sent-and the insurer acknowledged
receiving—a "General Change Endorsement" arguably terminating the reinsurance certificate.
The court noted that, under the terms of the reinsurance certificate's cancellation clause,
cancellation could be effected by ten days' written notice stating the effective date of the
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Here, the burden was on Blue Cross to show that it "strictly complied with the policy
provisions" regarding the mailing of notice. Cf. 361 P.2d at 667. It failed to do so because
it failed to prove that the notice to Mr. McCoy was "deposited in the United States Mail with
first class postage prepaid and addressed to the Subscriber at the address shown in the
records of the Plan." (See R. 112.) Therefore, the trial court's order should be affirmed.

3.

Blue Cross Did Not Meet Its Burden of Showing That Its Purported
Modification of the Policy Complied with the Governing Statutes and
Rules.

Before Blue Cross could amend Mr. McCoy's policy to require arbitration, it had to
comply not only with the terms of its own policy, but it also had to comply with applicable
statutes and rules.
At the time Blue Cross purported to amend Mr. McCoy's policy, the Utah Insurance
Code provided that no nonprofit health service corporation, such as Blue Cross, "shall
deliver or issue for delivery in this state any . . . endorsement. . . until a copy of the form
. . . has been filed with approval by the commissioner." UTAH CODE ANN. § 3 l-37-16(l)(a)
(Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).17 The statute further provided: "At the expiration of fifteen
days the form so filed shall be deemed approved unless prior thereto it has been affirmatively

cancellation. The endorsement did not give ten days' notice and was therefore ineffective.
See361P.2dat668.
17

The current Insurance Code, title 31A of the Utah Code, was enacted in
February 1985 but did not become effective until July 1, 1986. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 242,
§59.
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approved or disapproved by order of the commissioner." Id. § 3 l-37-16(l)(b). Finally, the
statute stated: "No form shall be issued, delivered, or used to which the commissioner's
approval does not exist" Id § 31-37-16(l)(d).
The evidence Blue Cross submitted in support of its motion showed that Blue Cross
sent the tape containing subscribers' names to Image Printing on or about November 14,
1985. (R. 244, | 10.) Image forwarded the printed letters to Progressive Direct Mail
Advertising, and Progressive completed the mailing on November 25, 1985. (R. 245,113.)
Blue Cross filed the proposed endorsement with Utah's insurance commission on or about
November 22, 1985. (R. 245, f 16.) However, Blue Cross submitted no evidence that the
insurance commissioner approved the endorsement before it was delivered or "issue[d] for
delivery" to subscribers. The endorsement would have been deemed approved "[a]t the
expiration of fifteen days" after the form was filed, but that would have been December 7,
1985—well after the endorsement was supposedly mailed to Mr. McCoy.18 Thus, under the
terms of the governing statute, the purported modification of the contract to require
arbitration was ineffective.

18

Not only was December 7 too late for approval under the terms of the statute,
but it was also too late under the terms of the contract. The policy required thirty days'
advance written notice of any change to the policy. {See R. 109.) The endorsement was
supposed to become effective on January 1, 1986. Therefore, it had to have been approved
and mailed by December 1, 1985. {See R. 31, lj 3.)
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Moreover, any later attempts by Blue Cross to modify the policy to require binding
arbitration were also ineffective.19
In 1987, the new Insurance Code was amended to allow for "permissible arbitration
provisions" in insurance contracts. See 1987 Utah Laws ch. 95, § 27 (codified at UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31A-21-314(2)). However, the statute did not define "permissible arbitration
provisions" but left it up to the Insurance Commissioner to do so. In 1988 the Insurance
Commissioner promulgated a regulation providing that "[b]oth compulsory and optional
binding arbitration at the election of either the insured or the insurer are 'permissible
arbitration provisions,'" UTAH ADMIN CODE R540-122-4.3 (1989) (renumbered R590-1224.3).20 but before an insurer can make binding arbitration a part of the contract of insurance,
it has to include in the application or binder for the insurance "a prominent statement
substantially as follows":
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND THE
COMPANY MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
(THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION OR OTHER
RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE ON

19

The "actual complete contract containing the arbitration provision" was not
filed with the insurance commission until August 10, 1989. (R. 245, ^ 17.) It is not clear
from the record which contract this was. In any event, any modification of the contract after
July 1, 1986, would have had to comply with the new Insurance Code, and there is no
evidence that Blue Cross met all the requirements of the new Insurance Code for modifying
the policy.
20

This rule replaced Utah State Insurance Department Bulletin 87-2 (a copy of
which is included in the addendum), which prohibited mandatory binding arbitration
provisions in insurance contracts.
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REQUEST FROM THE COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED BY
ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE
COMPANY.
THE ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE
ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE
ENTERED AS A JUDGEMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER
JURISDICTION.
Id R540-122-4.5 (renumbered R590-122-4.5). The regulation further requires that such a
statement be disclosed "prior to the execution of the insurance contract between the insurer
and the policy holder." Id. Blue Cross never provided Mr. McCoy with the required
statement and certainly not before execution of the policy; therefore, Blue Cross cannot
enforce the arbitration provision of the policy.
Moreover, the new Insurance Code provided that, subject to certain exceptions that
do not apply here, "no purported modification of a contract during the term of the policy
affects the obligations of a party to the contract unless the modification is in writing and
agreed to by the party against whose interest the modification operates." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31A-21-106(2) (1994) (emphasis added).21

21

Even in the absence of a statute, one party to a contract cannot unilaterally
modify the contract. The parties may agree to modify the contract, but any modification
requires the assent of each party and new consideration. See, e.g., Wright v. Johnson, 610
P.2d 567, 570 (Idaho 1980); National Interstate Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 630 P.2d 779, 783
(Okla. 1981); Rapp v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980);
Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979); Fisher v. Fisher, 907
P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Wagner v. Wagner, 621 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Wash.
1980). Cf. Massey v. Farmers Ins. Group, 837 P.2d 880, 884 (Okla. 1992) (one party to a
contract may not unilaterally decide to have someone other than a jury determine issues in
controversy, thereby destroying the other party's right to a jury trial) (citation omitted).
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Any purported modification of the contract in this case to require binding arbitration
of all disputes concerning the contract clearly operated against Mr. McCoy's interest, since,
without the modification, Mr. McCoy would have had a constitutional right to have his
dispute with Blue Cross decided in a court of law, before a jury of his peers. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799-800 (Utah 1998); Bamhart v. Civil Serv. Employees
Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873, 876 (1965). Parties who submit their claims to
arbitration "(1) give up their constitutional right to redress in the courts, (2) waive procedural
safeguards, including the rules of evidence and the rules of civil procedure, and (3) severely
limit their right of appeal. Thus,.. . arbitration strips participants of significant legal rights
. . . ." Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 803 (Russon, J., dissenting).22 Therefore, any purported
modification of the contract to add an arbitration provision required Mr. McCoy's agreement
to be effective.23 Mr. McCoy never received the proposed modification to the contract until

22

In Jenkins the court held that, because of the significant constitutional rights
a party gives up by agreeing to arbitrate, an arbitration agreement must be in writing to be
enforceable. See 962 P.2d at 799-800. On this point, the majority and dissent agreed. The
dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that, under some circumstances, an oral
agreement to arbitrate could be enforced under the equitable doctrine of part performance.
See id. at 802 (Russon, J., dissenting).
23

Blue Cross does not dispute that its purported modification of the contract to
require binding arbitration operated against Mr. McCoy's interests. It suggests, however,
that the arbitration provision was not a "less favorable" term of the contract under another
provision of the Insurance Code, UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994). That
provision states:
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the policy, but on less favorable
terms or at higher rates, the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to the policyholder notice of
-33-

he brought this action and never knew about it until after his claims arose, much less agreed
to it. Consequently, any purported modification of the contract to add a binding arbitration
provision after the new Insurance Code took effect (July 1, 1986) was not effective.
Blue Cross argues that section 31A-21-106(2) does not apply because the statute only
requires the insured's agreement if the policy is modified "during the term of the policy" and
the policy was not modified during its "term." According to Blue Cross, premiums on Mr.
McCoy's policy were due each quarter, and the modification was made effective at the end
of a quarter and thus not during the policy's "term." (See Br. of Appellant at 24.) The fact
that premiums may have been due each quarter, however, does not mean that the "term" of
the policy was just three months. The policy expressly provided: "The term of this
Agreement shall be for a period commencing on the Effective Date and continuing until this
Agreement is terminated as herein provided." (R. 108.) The policy then provided for
termination on the occurrence of certain events, such as nonpayment of dues, fraud or
misrepresentation by the insured, divorce, and the giving of thirty-days' written notice of
the new terms or rates at least 30 days prior to the expiration date of the prior
policy. If the insurer did not give this prior notification to the policyholder,
the new terms or rates do not take effect until 30 days after the notice is
delivered or sent by first class mail, in which case the policyholder may elect
to cancel the renewal policy at any time during the 30-day period....
(Emphasis added.) This provision does not apply because the term of the policy never
expired; consequently, the policy was never "renew[ed]." See infra Moreover, Blue Cross
failed to prove when it sent any notice of new terms to Mr. McCoy after the effective date
of the statute and failed to prove that any such notices were sent by first-class mail, as
required by the statute. (See supra, notes 12.) In any event, a policy provision that requires
a party to give up constitutional rights is clearly a "less favorable" term.
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termination by either side. (See R. 108-09.) None of those events occurred in this case
before this action was filed. Thus, the original term of the plan had not expired, and the
policy had not been effectively modified when Mr. McCoy's claims arose.

4.

Mailing Notice of a Proposed Arbitration Provision Is Not Sufficient to
Establish an "Agreement" to Arbitrate.

Even if Blue Cross had proved that it mailed to Mr. McCoy the endorsement
purporting to add an arbitration provision to the contract (and it did not), that would not have
been sufficient to meet Blue Cross's burden.
Before a party can be compelled to arbitrate, the intent of the parties to make
arbitration their exclusive remedy must be clear. "Parties are not to be led into arbitration
through subtlety." Ben-Reuven v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 526 N.Y.S.2d 752, 754 (Sup. Ct.
1988). The Utah Arbitration Act requires a written "arbitration agreement.''

UTAH CODE

ANN. § 78-31a-4(l). See also Jenkins v. Percival 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998). An
"agreement" (contained in the boilerplate of an adhesion contract) to some constructive or
substitute notice procedure for amending an insurance policy cannot substitute for the written
"agreement" to arbitrate that the Arbitration Act requires. One cannot "agree" to a provision
one does not even know about.
The Utah Supreme Court recently held that even the public policy supporting the
speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes cannot outweigh a person's constitutional right
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of access to the courts under article I, sections 7 and 11 of the Utah Constitution24 unless the
person waives that right. Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 800. Not only must any such waiver be in
writing, but it must also be "clear," id, "voluntary, intelligent, and knowing" id at 799.
Accord Barnhart, 398 P.2d at 877 (1965).25

This is consistent with constitutional

requirements: "[A] waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be
clear." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972). Courts "do not presume acquiescence in
the loss of fundamental rights." Ohio Bell Tel Co. v. Public Utilities Comm 'n of Ohio, 301
U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
One cannot knowingly and intelligently waive a right without knowing he is doing so,
yet that is what Blue Cross's argument amounts to. An "agreement" to accept constructive
notice of a change in a policy cannot substitute for a clear, knowing and intelligent waiver
of one's constitutional right of access to the courts. Blue Cross should not be able to
bootstrap an "agreement" that notices provided for in the policy could be mailed to the

24

Article I, section 7 states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law." Section 11 states, in relevant part: "All courts shall
be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay
25

The Draft Final Report of the Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution
established by the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association and the
American Medical Association, issued July 27, 1998, established a "Due Process Protocol
for Resolution of Health Care Disputes," including disputes over health plan coverage.
Principle 3 of the Due Process Protocol provides: "The agreement to use ADR [Alternative
Dispute Resolution, such as arbitration] should be knowing and voluntary." (The Draft Final
Report is available on the Internet at www.adr.org/hcdrc_final_report.html.)
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insured into an "agreemenf' to changes that the insured never knew of, particularly when his
constitutional rights are at stake. Blue Cross was required to show a clear, knowing and
intelligent written agreement waiving Mr. McCoy's constitutional right of access to the
courts. A constructive notice provision in an adhesion contract that does not mention
arbitration does not satisfy that requirement. Cf Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp.,
119 F.3d 756, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1997) (a knowing waiver does not occur where the plaintiff
does not know about the arbitration provision and is not expressly put on notice that he is
giving up his right of access to the courts), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 1511 (1998).
This case is similar to McGreevy v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Company, 876 P.2d
463 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994), affd on other grounds, 904 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1995). The
plaintiff in that case sought to stack uninsured motorist coverage limits for several
automobiles. The insurer denied stacking, relying in part on an endorsement to the policy
that it claimed it had sent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied ever having received the
endorsement. A jury returned a special verdict finding that the insurer had not mailed the
endorsement to Ms. McGreevy. On appeal, the insurer argued, first, that the endorsement
was effective regardless of whether the insured actually received it. The court rejected the
argument:
Following the issuance of the policy here, Oregon Mutual [the insurer]
attempted to unilaterally amend it to take advantage of changes in the law
which authorized the prohibition of stacking. But this required a change in the
contract of insurance which, in turn, required a meeting of the minds and
agreement. Notice and agreement must be obtained before amendments or
modifications to insurance policies can be made by the insurer
-37-

876 P.2d at 469 (emphasis added and citations omitted).
The court also rejected the argument that a reference to the endorsement on the
bottom of a declarations page the insured periodically received was sufficient to notify the
insured of the purported change in the policy. The court noted, "Without receipt of the
actual endorsement, which the jury concluded [the plaintiff] did not receive, the notation
would not have been meaningful." Id

Similarly, the reference to arbitration on the

Explanation of Claims Processed forms that Mr. McCoy periodically received was not
sufficient to put Mr. McCoy on notice that he had lost hisrightto litigate any claim in a court
of law, particularly where it only said that he had the "right" to arbitrate, not that he was
required to arbitrate or that he had lost his right to seek redress in court. (See infra, pt. LC.)
The court also rejected the insurer's argument that an increase in premiums should
have put the insured on notice that a change had been made to her policy. 876 P.2d at 470.
Here, there was no change in the premiums Blue Cross charged Mr. McCoy, despite Blue
Cross's representation that the modification of the contract to add an arbitration provision
"should further save money on behalf of our subscribers." (See R. 34.)
Finally, the Washington court rejected the insurer's argument that it should not have
to prove that it mailed the endorsement to the insured. The court noted that the insurer
"could have had each insured sign a copy of the amendment and return it to an insurance
agent verifying that they received and understood the changes; the notice could [also] have
been mailed certified or registered-any of which would have provided evidence of notice"—
but the insurer elected not to. 876 P.2d at 470. Similarly, Blue Cross could have obtained
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proof that its insured received and agreed to the change in its policy by requiring Mr. McCoy
to acknowledge receipt of and agreement with the change in writing, but it chose not to.
Because Mr. McCoy never agreed to arbitrate his dispute with Blue Cross and never
received—much less agreed to-any modification of his policy to require binding arbitration,
the arbitration provision of the plan was unenforceable as to Mr. McCoy.

C.

Mr. McCoy's Failure to Cancel His Policy When He Learned of the Arbitration
Provision Does Not Constitute an Agreement to Arbitrate.
Blue Cross argues that, even if Mr. McCoy did not agree to Blue Cross's proposed

modification of the contract to require arbitration before his claim arose, by not canceling
his contract when he learned of the arbitration provision, Mr. McCoy effectively waived any
objection to arbitration. The argument fails on both the facts and the law.
Mr. McCoy first received notice that his policy purportedly provided for arbitration
in January 1995, when he received Mr. Pignanelli's letter. (See R. 81, ^ 10.) But even then,
he did not know that the policy purported to preclude himfromseeking redress in the courts.
Mr. Pignanelli's letter said that Mr. McCoy had "the right to seek binding arbitration of the
dispute" (R. 133), not that he was required to arbitrate the dispute. (See R. 266.) Although
Mr. McCoy had previously received Explanation of Claims Processed forms, those forms
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also said only that he had the "right" to have any dispute arbitrated, not that arbitration was
his only option. (See R. 84, % 22; 135-36.)26
A "righf' is a legally enforceable claim or power that one person has against another.
See, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 (1972); Vega v. Morris, 910 P.2d 6, 9
(Ariz. 1996). It is different from an obligation, which is what "a person is bound to do."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 968 (5th ed.

1979). By telling Mr. McCoy that he had a "right"

to arbitrate, Blue Cross was telling him that he could arbitrate his dispute, not that he had to
arbitrate it or that he was precludedfrombringing a legal action to enforce his rights. Mr.
McCoy did not receive a copy of the arbitration provision Blue Cross is relying on until after
he brought this action. (See R. 266, f 4; 30.) By that time, Mr. McCoy had canceled his
policy. (See R. 245, If 18.) Because Mr. McCoy never saw the arbitration provision before
hefiledthis action, he did not waive any objection to it by not canceling his policy sooner.
Even if Mr. McCoy had known that his policy required binding arbitration in January
1995 (and he did not), he did not agree to binding arbitration of this dispute by not canceling
his policy at that time.
Blue Cross relies on Imperial Savings Association v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068 (D.
Utah 1990), for its argument that Mr. McCoy's failure to object to the arbitration provision
of the policy after he became aware of hisrightto arbitrate constitutes an acceptance of the

26

Mr. McCoy did not recall reading this boilerplate language on the Explanation
of Claims Processed forms before this action arose but testified that, even if he had, he would
not have understood from it that binding arbitration was his only option. (R. 84, \ 23.)
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arbitration provision. In that case, Stewart Title Company issued a title insurance policy to
Imperial Savings. The commitment for the policy did not contain an arbitration provision,
but the policy did. Imperial claimed it never received the original policy, but it admitted that
it later requested and received a copy of the policy and that its attorneys had reviewed the
copy. See 730 F. Supp. at 1070, 1073. The court held that Imperial's receipt and retention
of the copy for over eleven months without objection constituted an acceptance of the policy,
including its arbitration provision, as a matter of law. Id at 1073.
Imperial Savings is distinguishable. Mr. McCoy never received a copy of the policy
containing the arbitration provision before he filed this action, much less did he have the
policy reviewed by his attorneys. (See R. 81,ffij8-9; 83-84, ^ 20; 266, ^ 4.) Blue Cross
never told Mr. McCoy that he was giving up his right to go to court by accepting his policy.
(See R. 80,fflf3-4; 82, f 12; 83-84,fflf20-23; 266, f 4.) Mr. McCoy understood from Mr.
Pignanelli's January 13, 1995, letter that he could request arbitration, not that arbitration was
his only option. (See R. 83-84, % 20; 266, f 3.) Because Mr. McCoy did not want
arbitration, he had no reason to ask to see the policy's arbitration provision.
In any event, the underlying rationale of Imperial Savings and the cases it relies on
is that if the insured does not want to arbitrate disputes under the insurance policy, he can
always get a new policy. That it was not an option for Mr. McCoy once Mrs. McCoy was
diagnosed with cancer. In the cases Imperial Savings relied on for the principle that
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retention of a policy without objection after a reasonable time constitutes acceptance of the
policy, the policy was deemed accepted before any loss occurred.27
To the extent Imperial Savings can be read to require arbitration where the insured
first learned of an asserted arbitration provision after his claim arose, Mr. McCoy submits
that Imperial Savings was wrongly decided.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE,

Under R590-122-4.5 of the UTAH

an arbitration provision that is not disclosed until after the contract

is entered into is not a "permissible arbitration provision" allowed by statute. Moreover,
once a loss has occurred, the insured does not really have the choice of getting a new policy
to cover the loss. The insurer should not be able to force its insured to make a Hobson's
choice between accepting an arbitration provision or giving up his health insurance once the
insured has been diagnosed with a serious illness and has incurred medical expenses of the
type for which he bought the insurance in the first place. The insured should not have to
choose between accepting a new, unbargained for term of the policy or canceling the policy
and giving up the benefits he did bargain for. The contract that was in force when Mrs.
McCoy contracted breast cancer is the contract that should govern the parties' rights and
obligations. That contract did not have an arbitration provision. Therefore, the trial court
correctly concluded that Mr. McCoy was not required to arbitrate his claim.

27

See Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47, 49 (N.M. 1968);
Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 558, 559 (Okla. 1969). See also
Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Flanagan, 284 So.2d 33, 34 (Miss. 1973); Porter v. Butte
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 360 P.2d 372, 373 (N.M. 1961).
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n.
IF THE COURT DECIDES THAT MR. McCOY'S POLICY WAS
EFFECTIVELY AMENDED TO REQUIRE ARBITRATION,
THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THE CASE FOR THE TRIAL COURT
TO RULE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S OTHER ARGUMENTS AS TO WHY
THE POLICY'S ARBITRATION PROVISION IS UNENFORCEABLE.
In opposition to Blue Cross's motion to compel arbitration, Mr. McCoy raised a
number of arguments as to why Blue Cross could not enforce the arbitration provision even
if it were a part of the parties9 contract. (See R. 60-77.) The trial court did not reach those
arguments because it found that there was no agreement to arbitrate.28 If this court reverses
that determination, it should not compel arbitration but should remand the case for the trial
court to consider the plaintiffs other arguments as to why any arbitration provision is
unenforceable.

III.
THE ALLEGED PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION
SHOULD NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
Blue Cross argues that this court should review the trial court's ruling in light of the
alleged presumption in favor of arbitration. (See, e.g., Br. of Appellant at 3-4, 24 n.3, 32.)
That presumption should not apply in this case, for several reasons.
28

The trial court, for example, was initially persuaded by Mr. McCoy's argument
that Blue Cross should not be able to enforce the arbitration provision because it breached
its own procedures for dealing with claims such as Mr. McCoy's. (See Tr., 8-15-97, R.297,
at 2-3.) The court did not rule on that issue, however, because it found no agreement to
arbitrate in the first place.
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First, "policies supporting liberal enforcement of arbitration agreements inhere only
once the arbitration agreement is established." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d at 800. That
is because arbitration
'"is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'" . . . Thus, "[although
there is a presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be required to
arbitrate when it 1ms not agreed to do so." . . . "[W]e must first conclude that
arbitration is a remedy which has been bargained for by the parties. Only
when such agreement on arbitration exists may we encourage arbitration by
liberal interpretation of the arbitration provisions themselves."
Cade v. Zions First Nat'I Bank 956 P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citations
omitted). Here, for the reasons discussed above, there was no arbitration agreement. See
supra point I. Therefore, no presumption applies.
Second, while public policy may favor the "speedy and inexpensive resolutions of
controversies . . . in some cases, these considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional right
of access to the courts" where, as here, one has not clearly waived that right. Jenkins, 962
P.2d at 800. Public policy demands a voluntary, clear and knowing waiver of the
constitutional right of access to the courts, and no such waiver occurred in this case.
Third, the "presumption" in favor of arbitration is based on the public policy favoring
freedom of contract. That policy says that parties should be free to fashion their own
agreements, and courts should enforce the agreements the parties bargain for. The arbitration
provision in this case was not bargained for. It was unilaterally mandated by Blue Cross,
without actual notice to Mr. McCoy. Mr. McCoy never knew of the provision before this
dispute arose. Blue Cross freely admits that its policy was an adhesion contract, that Mr.
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McCoy had no choice to accept coverage and reject arbitration. (See Tr., 2-6-98, R. 298, at
8.) His only choice was to accept Blue Cross's terms (which Blue Cross could change at any
time, without actual notice to him), try to find health insurance elsewhere or choose to forego
health insurance altogether. If he did not like arbitration, he could not continue coverage and
bargain away other rights.
The Utah Supreme Court long ago recognized the reality of the situation:
[Insurance contracts] are long, involved documents containing many
paragraphs of fine print, among which is immersed the arbitration provision.
The insured is usually simply in the position of desiring to purchase some . . .
insurance, and insofar as the policy is concerned, is not in a position to frame
his own policy or to propose conditions of his own. He is obliged to take the
policy that is offered with its various and sundry provisions, many of which
he is quite unaware of. . . . The insured is not required to read, nor to
understand, nor to sign anything, but only to pay his premium. The practical
reality is that the lay purchaser is in an inferior bargaining position and
simply accepts unilaterally the policy as prepared by the company. Under
such circumstances, it would be inequitable and unjust to hold that he had
given up so important a privilege as his right to seek justice in court unless it
clearly appeared that he was aware of what he was doing, and that he had
voluntarily made such a commitment
Barnhart v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873, 877 (1965)
(emphasis added).29

29

The Draft Final Report of the Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution
(see supra note 25) also recognizes that ADR systems such as arbitration in health-care plans
"will invariably not be the product of a negotiated agreement" and that "key aspects of
procedural due process," including a "knowing and voluntary agreement to use ADR," are
essential "to ensure a 'level playing field' for resolving health care disputes by ADR." Draft
Final Report, § XH.A. & C.
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There are good reasons why an insurer such as Blue Cross would insist on mandatory,
binding arbitration. It does not want its contract and its practices subjected to the sort of
disinterested scrutiny they would have to undergo in a court of law.
The rule of law is built on the doctrine of stare decisis ("to stand by things decided").
Under stare decisis, a court is required to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same
points arise again in litigation. Similarly, under the related doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel, a party that has litigated a matter and lost is bound by that result in future
litigation. Stare decisis "is a maxim of practically universal application."
GARNER,
CROSS

A DICTIONARY

OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE

BRYAN

A.

827 (2d ed. 1995) (quoting RUPERT

& J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 3 (4th ed. 1991)). It is recognized

almost everywhere, except in arbitration, that is.
Arbitrators are not bound by precedent. They are bound neither by prior judicial
decisions nor by the decisions of other arbitrators. Arbitrators are not required to state the
grounds for their decisions, see

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-31a-10, and the fact that an

arbitration award is contrary to law is not grounds for vacating the award, id. § 78-3 la-14(1).
Cf. Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (an
arbitration award may only be overturned for "manifest disregard of the law," a much higher
standard than an error of law).
An arbitration award does not become binding precedent. An insurance company that
loses an arbitration is not bound by that decision in a subsequent arbitration involving the
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same issues. The company can take unlimited bites of the apple, in the hopes of winning at
least once.
Arbitrations, unlike court proceedings, are not conducted in public. They are not
subject to the scrutiny of public opinion.
Thus, by requiring mandatory arbitration of disputes, which, Blue Cross admits, is not
a bargained-for provision of the contract but is unilaterally imposed on insureds on a take-itor-leave-it basis {see Tr., 2-6-98, R. 298, at 8), Blue Cross can insure that its practices,
policies and procedures never see the light of day. It can effectively guarantee that it will
be able to follow and apply its own interpretations of its policies indefinitely and will never
be required to follow a court's construction of its policies.
Moreover, by requiring binding arbitration a company such as Blue Cross can
guarantee itself a favorable forum. Although arbitrators are supposed to be neutral, an
arbitrator who repeatedly rules against an insurance company will soon find himself out of
a job. The arbitrator is dependent on the insurance company for repeat business. An
arbitrator stays in business if he can work with insurance companies, since the insurance
company can veto the choice of arbitrator. Insurance companies are constantly before
arbitrators, but it is highly unlikely that the arbitrator will ever see the same insured more
than once. An arbitrator who gives a significant ruling against a partyfromwhom he or she
receives a significant amount of business might as well find a new profession.
Finally, many of the due process safeguards found injudicial proceedings are largely
absent in arbitration. The relative "speedy and inexpensive" resolution of controversies
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arbitration makes possible is achieved by severely limiting discovery, ignoring evidentiary
rules, giving the arbitrator almost unbridled discretion to make decisions, without explaining
the bases for those decisions, and providing only the most limited appeal rights. See UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-3 la-7, -8, -10, -13, -14 & -15.

Blue Cross suggests that arbitration is actually a benefit to insureds. It suggests that
insureds should want arbitration because they often do not have "the financial resources to
wage a traditional protracted legal battle against an insurance company." (Br. of Appellant
at 24 n.3.) However, an insured seeking arbitration may be required to front all the costs of
the arbitration. (See R. 35.) He may or may not be reimbursed for those costs, see UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-11, and may be stuck with having to pay the insurer's attorney fees if
he challenges the arbitrator's award in court, see id § 78-3 la-16. On the other hand, an
insured who takes his insurance company to court may be able to recover his attorney's fees
as consequential damages. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah
1996).
Blue Cross also suggests that the arbitration provision in this case was fair because
it gave either side the right to request arbitration. In fact, as a practical matter the arbitration
provision in this case worked only one way. Under Blue Cross's "Member Grievance
Procedure," the first three steps all involve internal decisions by Blue Cross. (See R. 46.)
Arbitration becomes an option only if the insured disputes Blue Cross's decision at each step
of the way. Blue Cross would never have any reason to appeal its own decision. Indeed,
Blue Cross's grievance procedure acknowledges that the procedures are meant only for the
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insured. (See R. 46 ("The following . . . steps [are] available to you, the Member").)
Because the insured is the only one who would have reason to challenge Blue Cross's
decision, it is the insured who is most adversely affected by the arbitration provision.
In any event, the fact that arbitration may have benefits in some cases does not alter
the fact that a party who agrees to arbitration gives up significant constitutional rights and
therefore must clearly, knowingly and voluntarily agree to binding arbitration.
For all these reasons, this court should not apply any alleged presumption in favor of
arbitration in this case.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order denying Blue Cross's motion to
compel arbitration and stay these proceedings should be afBrmed. Alternatively, if this court
finds that the trial court erred, it should remand the case for the trial court to consider Mr.
McCoy's other arguments as to why the arbitration provision is unenforceable.
DATED this 16th day of December, 1998.
DEWSNUP, KING & OLSEN

David R. Olsen, Esq.
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg, Esq.
Paul M. Simmons, Esq.

(Original signature)
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toAndrew H. Stone
James E. Magleby
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170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah
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(Original signature)
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ADDENDUM

-51-

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as
thefindingsof the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of
law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or
appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need
not enterfindingsof fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the
ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and
59 when the motion is based on more than one ground.
UTAH CODE ANN. (1996)
78-3 la-3. Arbitration agreement.
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to set
aside the agreement, or whenfraudis alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
78-31 a-4. Court order to arbitrate.
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the
agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration
accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement is
involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear
motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall be made to that court. Otherwise, the
motion shall be made to a court with proper venue.

(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or proceeding
involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. However, if the issue is
severable from the other issues in the action or proceeding, only the issue subject to
arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in an action or proceeding, the order for
arbitration shall include a stay of the action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim that an
issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have not
been shown.
UTAH CODE ANN. (SUPP. 1985) (REPEALED 1985, EFFECTIVE 1986)
31-37-16. Filing forms and schedules with commissioner — Procedure — Hospital or
medical-surgical benefits — Provision for dependents required.
(l)(a) On and after the effective date of this act, no corporation subject to its
provisions shall deliver or issue for delivery in this state any subscription certificate or
membership certificate describing health benefits available, or any endorsement, rider, or
application which becomes a part thereof, until a copy of the form and the schedule of
rates, dues, fees, or other periodic charges, to be paid by subscribers or members, has
been filed with approval by the commissioner.
(b) At the expiration of fifteen days the form so filed shall be deemed approved
unless prior thereto it has been affirmatively approved or disapproved by order of the
commissioner. The commissioner may withdraw approval at any time for cause.
(c) The commissioner's order disapproving any form or withdrawing previous
approval shall state the grounds for disapproval or withdrawal.
(d) No form shall be issued, delivered, or used to which the commissioner's
approval does not exist.
(e) The commissioner may, by order, exempt from the requirements of this section
for so long as he deems proper, any document or form specified in the order, to which in
his opinion this section may not practicably be applied, or the filing and approval of
which are, in his opinion, not desirable or necessary for the protection of the public.
UTAH CODE ANN. (1994)
31A-21-314. Prohibited provisions.
No insurance policy subject to this chapter may contain any provision:
(2) depriving Utah courts of jurisdiction over an action against the insurer,
except as provided in permissible arbitration provisions . . . .
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UTAH ADMIN. CODE (SUPP. OCT. 1,1997)
R590-122-4. Rule.
2.
Optional binding arbitration at the exclusive election of an insured party is
a "permissible arbitration provision," in which case the disclosure provisions in paragraph
5 below shall not be applicable.
3.
Both compulsory and optional binding arbitration at the election of either
the insured or the insurer are "permissible arbitration provisions."
5.
Except as excluded in paragraph 2 above, each application or binder
pertaining to an insurance policy which contains a permissible arbitration provision must
include or have attached a prominent statement substantially as follows:
ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND THE COMPANY MAY
BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF (THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
OR OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR), A COPY OF WHICH IS AVAILABLE
ON REQUEST FROM THE COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED BY
ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE COMPANY.
THE ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IF ALLOWED
BY STATE LAW AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A JUDGEMENT IN ANY COURT
OF PROPER JURISDICTION.
Such statement must be disclosed prior to the execution of the insurance contract
between the insurer and the policy holder and, in the case of group insurance, shall be
contained in the certificate of insurance or other disclosure of benefits.
UTAH CODE ANN. (SUPP. 1997)
31A-21-106. Incorporation by reference.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as otherwise mandated by law,
no purported modification of a contract during the term of the policy affects the
obligations of a party to the contract unless the modification is in writing and agreed to
by the party against whose interest the modification operates.
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V
ARBITRATION
This Bulletin is being released for the purpose of stating the
Department's position in regard to certain arbitration provisions
incorporated within policy forms and intended for use in this
state. Many insurers have submitted forms which contain mandatory
binding arbitration provisions requiring claimants to submit to
these procedures as a condition to further rights under the policy.
Arbitration, as an alternative dispute method, is in the public
interest and a recognized option to a judicial determination of
issues.
It is hoped that insureds will take advantage of
arbitration procedures, recognizing that it may in many instances
promote an expedient, efficient result of a dispute. To that end,
the Department favors alternative dispute resolution procedures
that are in the public interestHowever, mandatory binding
arbitration provisions are contrary to the Insurance Code.
Sections 31A-21-313(3)(c) and 31A-21-314(2) of the Insurance Code
prohibit insurers from enforcing policy provisions which deny
access to the courts by insureds. The Department has determined
that mandatory
binding
arbitration
procedures
which
require
insureds to relinquish their rights to pursue an action against
the insurer in the courts are violative of the above cited
statutes. Consequently, mandatory binding arbitration is not in
the public interest. The Department has no objection to contract
grievance procedures which allow the insured the option, at some
step, to pursue binding arbitration or a judicial resolution of
issues.
Policy forms submitted to the Department which contain mandatory
binding arbitration provisions will be disapproved under Section
31A-21-201(2)(a)(iv). Mandatory binding arbitration provisions in
previously
approved
forms
are unenforceable.
They will be
construed under Section 31A-21-107 and applied as if in compliance
with the Insurance Code. All policy forms must fully comply with
these requirements no later than July 1, 1987.
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